Are smart people
overrated? Do smart people deserve a place in the organization just because
they are smart? These are the questions which Malcolm Gladwell tries to answer
in his inimitable style in What the Dogs Saw, the freewheeling book, casting
its net on a wide range of topics with liberal scattering of Gladwell’s
matchless wit and insight.
At the height of the
dot-com boom of the 1990s, several executives at McKinsey & Company, America ’s
largest and most prestigious management-consulting firm, launched what they
called the
War for Talent. Data collected from thousands of questionnaires,
focused attention of three days to specially identified eighteen companies,
interviewing everyone down from CEO, McKinsey wanted to document how top-performing
companies differed from others in hiring and promotion. The three McKinsey
consultants - Ed Michaels, Helen Handfield-Jones, and Beth Axelord – found the
differences profound. They claimed the
very best companies had leaders who were obsessed with talent issue. They
recruited talented people ceaselessly. They “singled out and segregated their
stars, rewarding them disproportionately, and pushing them into ever more to
senior positions”.
According to the three consultants success requires “the
talent mind-set”: the “deep-seated belief that having better talent at all
levels is how you outperform your compatriots”. Talent mindset is the new
mantra of American management, demanding the high premium on degrees from the
first tier business schools.
Talent is all important.
The system is as good as the stars. One of the major companies which took the
McKinsey mantra of talent was Enron. Enron was a large client of McKinsey with
twenty separate projects and billings of $10 million a year. A McKinsey director
regularly attended Enron’s board meetings; the CEO of Enron was an erstwhile
partner of McKinsey. What happened to Enron since is matter of history. The
reputations of its top executives Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay were
destroyed; their auditors, Arthur Anderson were driven out of business. Yet the
one partner who comes out unscathed is McKinsey.
According to Gladwell “Enron was the ultimate ‘talent’company”. In the nineties Enron was bringing 250 newly minted MBAs a year. Once in the company, they were rewarded inordinately. According to Lay, former CEO of Enron, “The only thing that differentiates Enron from our competitors is our people, our talent” Richard Foster of McKinsey who celebrated Enron with his book Ceative Destruction quotes an Enron executive, “We hire very smart people and we pay them more than they think they are worth”. Enron followed McKinsey’s advice in letter and spirit.
The core of The War of
Talents is differentiation and affirmation. Employers need to
candidly probe through no-holds-barred debate about each individual a couple of
times an year. The A types must be challenged and disproportionately rewarded.
The B types should be encouraged and affirmed. The Cs have to shape up or be
shipped out. The consultants or the clients had little clue on how this had to
be done.
More than five decades
ago Peter Drucker had emphatically said that the only thing that matters was
performance. Today’s employer is also equally clear that what he wants to
assess is performance. Assessing performance objectively is a matter many
organizations have not been able to grapple. You can assess performance only
when you know what has been performed. “And, in the freewheeling culture of
Enron, this was all but impossible. People deemed talented were constantly
being pushed into new jobs and given new challenges. Annual turnover from
promotions was close to 20 percent…How do you evaluate someone’s performance in
a system where no one is in a job long enough to
allow such evaluation?” The
answer is that you end up evaluating everything other than performance. Here is
an example by an admiring book by Gary Hamel, Leading the Revolution. Lou
Pai launched Enron’s power-trading business. Pai failed to grasp the
implications of the new deregulation of the market causing loss of tens of
millions of dollars. He was promptly given the chance to build the commercial
electricity-outsourcing business which lost several millions of dollars in a
few years. As Pai was talented he was given opportunity after opportunity each
time he failed before he was shipped out with a huge golden hand-shake. Hamel
writes appreciatively that in Enron failures even big enough to figure on Wall
Street Journal front pages would not sink a career. Gladwell asks, “…if talent
is defined as something separate from an employee’s actual performance, what
use is it exactly?”
Gladwell continues, “The
broader failing of McKinsey and its acolytes at Enron is their assumption that
an organization’s intelligence is simply a function of the intelligence of its
employees. They believe in stars because they don’t believe in systems” They
assume that it is people who make organizations smart. Indeed, Relativity was
discovered by an individual; Nobel winning novels were the creation of
individuals. The individual, the smart individual, therefore, is paramount. Yet,
more often than not it is the organization that makes the individual smart.
A look at some of America ’s most
successful companies will provide ample evidence of this. Southwest Airlines is
by far the most successful of all US airlines because it has created
a much more efficient organization than its competitors. Its turnaround time –
that is the time between just landing and takeoff – is twenty minutes with a
crew of four and two people at the gate as compared to thirty-five minutes with
a crew of twelve and three persons at the gate for United Airlines. Southwest recruits
a few MBAs, pays its managers modestly and gives rises on seniority.
Procter & Gamble, a
venerable American FMCG company does not have a star system. It does not
attract MBAs. It is not a glamorous company. But it dominates the FMCG business
for almost a century. It has “a carefully conceived managerial system, and a
rigorous marketing methodology that has allowed it to win battles for brands
like Crest and Tide decade after decade”.
Gladwell raises some
pertinent questions about the God almighty of consulting business, McKinsey.
“The one Enron partner that has escaped largely unscathed is McKinsey, which is
odd, given that it essentially created the blueprint for the Enron culture.” He
goes on to add, “McKinsey was as much a prisoner of the talent myth as its
clients were. In 1998 Enron hired ten Wharton MBAs; that same year, McKinsey
hired forty. In 1999, Enron hired twelve from Wharton; McKinsey hired
sixty-one. The consultants at McKinsey were preaching Enron what they believed
about themselves. …They were there looking for people who had the talent to
think outside the box. It never occurred to them that, if everyone had to think
outside the box, may be it was the box that needed fixing.”
By V.K.Talithaya (vktalithaya@managementmasala.com)
By V.K.Talithaya (vktalithaya@managementmasala.com)
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